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Casenote
Rationality of Guest Statute
Classifications Questioned
Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,
506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
I. INTRODUCTION
Brown v. Merlol presented the typical guest statute situation.
The plaintiff guest was riding in a jeep operated by the defendant
on a public highway. The jeep crossed the center line of the
highway and crashed into an embankment on the opposite side of
the road. As a result, the plaintiff incurred physical injuries and
brought suit, alleging both negligence and wilful misconduct on
the part of the defendant driver. Defendant sought a summary
judgment on the negligence element, claiming that the California
guest statute clearly exonerated a driver for ordinary negligence
to his guest.2 The plaintiff responded that the guest statute was
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. The trial court
granted the defendant's motion, from which the plaintiff appealed.
In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court held
that the classifications created by the guest statute bore no ra-
tional relation to either of the statute's two traditionally espoused
purposes of promoting a host's hospitality and preventing collusive
lawsuits. Hence, as applied to a negligently injured guest, the
statute violated the equal protection guarantees of both the Cali-
fornia and United States Constitutions.8
1. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
2. Ch. 1600, § 1, [19613 Cal. Laws Reg. Sess. 3428-29, as amended, CAL.
VEHCLE CODE § 17158 ('West Supp. 1974) provided:
No person riding in or occupying a vehicle owned by him
and driven by another person with his permission and no
person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon
a highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor
any other person, has any right of action for civil damages
against the driver of the vehicle or against any other person
legally liable for the conduct of the driver on account of per-
sonal injury to or the death of the owner or guest during
the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes
that the injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxi-
cation or wilful misconduct of the driver.
3. 8 Cal. 3d at 859, 506 P.2d at 214-15, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
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Guest statutes have long been the target of scathing criticism
by a host of commentators who have generally urged their abroga-
tion.4  Nonetheless, guest statutes are still in existence in 25
states.5 The significance of the Brown decision is that it marks
the first instance in which equal protection guarantees have been
successfully employed to judicially abrogate a guest statute.6 The
purpose of this note is to analyze the court's rationale and to de-
termine what implications Brown may have on the constitutional-
ity of the Nebraska guest statute.
Set against the background of California law, the court con-
cluded that its guest statute created three classifications. First,
the statute discriminated between the automobile guest and other
guests, specifically, social guests on a landowner's property. Sec-
ond, it discriminated between automobile passengers (paying rid-
ers) and automobile guests (non-paying riders) in the driver's
car. Third, the statute discriminated between different sub-
classes of automobile guests, such as auto guests injured on a
highway and auto guests injured on a private road.7
Since these three classifications involved no fundamental right
or suspect classification, the court found that the traditional
equal protection standard of review was applicable.8  In defining
4. Gibson, Let's Abolish Guest Passenger Legislation, 35 MAN. B.N. 274(1964); Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them, 9 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 1 (1968); Weinstein, Should We Kill the Guest Passenger
Act?, 33 DET. LAW. 185 (1965); Comment, The Ohio Guest Statute,
22 OHio ST. L.J. 629 (1961).
5. For a state-by-state compilation of these guest statutes, see Comment,
Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 So. CAL. L. REv. 884
(1968).
6. In Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929), the Court upheld a Connecti-
cut guest statute against an equal protection attack. However, the
Brown court found that case not to be controlling for three reasons.
First, unlike the statute construed in Silver, the California statute cre-
ated three classification schemes instead of only one. Second, Silver
was not set against the background of almost universal liability in-
surance. Third, Silver was not set against the background of Row-
land v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968),
where social guests on one's land were given the protection of ordi-
nary care. 8 Cal. 3d at 863-64 n.4, 506 P.2d at 217-18, 106 Cal. Rptr.
at 393-94. Also, in the post-Brown decision of Tisko v. Harrison, 500
S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), an equal protection attack similar
to the one employed in Brown was unsuccessfully attempted upon
the Texas guest statute.
Two other courts, however, have recently embraced the Brown ra-
tionale in finding automobile guest statutes unconstitutional Henry
v. Bauder, - Kan. -, - P.2d - (1974); Putney v. Piper, Law No.
2798 (Polk Co., Iowa, filed Aug. 1, 1973).
7. 8 Cal. 3d at 863, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
8. Had the statute involved a suspect classification or had it encroached
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that traditional standard, the court equated the California stand-
ard with what it determined to be the current federal standard.
It ruled that, under both standards, the statutory classification
must bear a real and substantial rational relation to the actual pur-
poses of the legislative act, and that it is not enough that there is
some conceivable reason or purpose that might support the dis-
criminatory treatment.9
The court correctly found the purposes of the guest statute to
be two-fold.' 0 First, the act is designed to protect and promote
hospitality by insulating generous drivers from lawsuits for negli-
gence instituted by ungrateful guests who have benefitted from a
free ride. Second, the statute helps prevent collusive lawsuits.
The rationale is that since most automobile guests are close friends
or relatives of the driver, and since the driver is usually covered
by insurance, there is a natural tendency for the two parties to act
in collusion and fabricate negligence claims in order to receive
compensation. By requiring the guest to prove some form of ag-
gravated negligence or wilful misconduct on the driver's part, the
risk of collusion is greatly diminished. The court tested the ra-
tionality of the three classification schemes engendered by the
statute in light of the statute's two purposes.
II. PROTECTION OF HOSPITALITY PURPOSE
A. Social Guest On Land vs. Auto Guest
Under the California decision of Rowland v. Christian,"1 a social
guest on a host's land is owed a duty of ordinary care by his gen-
upon a fundamental interest, then the more demanding "strict scru-
tiny" equal protection standard of review would have been applica-
ble. Under that standard, the proponent of the statute has the burden
of showing that the disparity in treatment flowing from the class-
ification is necessary to promote a "compelling" state interest. See,
e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
9. 8 Cal. 3d at 861, 506 P.2d at 216, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392. See also
footnote 7 in the court's opinion in which the court succinctly sum-
marized its approach:
Although by straining our imagination, we could possibly de-
rive a theoretically 'conceivable,' but totally unrealistic, state
purpose that might support this classification scheme, we do
not believe our constitutional adjudicatory function should begoverned by such a highly fictional approach to statutory
purpose.
8 Cal. 3d at 865-66, 506 P.2d at 219, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395-96.
10. For a general discussion of these two traditional purposes underlying
the guest statutes, see 2 F. HARER & F. JAwEs, LAw or ToRTs § 16.15
at 961 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK or THE LAw OF ToRTs § 34 at
187 (4th ed. 1971).
11. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). In Rowland,
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erous and hospitable host. However, under the California guest
statute, a guest in an automobile is owed a duty of less than ordi-
nary care by his generous host.1 2 The court reasoned that if the
purpose of the guest statute is to protect and promote hospitality
in society by insulating a generous host from liability for ordinary
negligent injury incurred by a recipient of that generosity, then
the statutory scheme lacked any rationality since both of these
guests are the recipients of a host's generous hospitality. Only the
auto guest, however, is stripped of protection against ordinary
negligence. The court concluded that since these two classes of
guests are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
guest act, yet are denied like treatment, they were being denied
equal protection of the law.'3
The court's conclusion of irrationality in the auto guest-prop-
erty guest classification can be questioned. The conclusion is
premised on the debatable assumption that these two recipients
of hospitality are indeed "similarly situated" with respect to the
statute's purpose of protecting and promoting hospitality. It is
possible that the legislature believes that the socially valued ele-
ment of hospitality is much more open to attack in the automo-
bile situation than in the property situation and thus merits this
greater degree of legislative protection. For example, the legislature
may reasonably have concluded that the financial consequences
to a host of a lawsuit against him by his guest are much more sig-
nificant in the automobile context, because the degree of physical
injury arising out of an automobile accident is generally much
greater. In addition, such a lawsuit could tend to inhibit the ex-
tension of hospitality. Thus, in singling out the automobile guest
situation for special regulation, the legislature may not have been
acting arbitrarily. Instead, it may have been attempting to regu-
late the area in which "chilling" lawsuits are felt most sharply.
Equal protection does not require a state to regulate an evil
by uniformly regulating all the classes in which that evil is felt.
Rather, it is enough that the statute regulates the specific class in
which the evil is felt most sharply.14 In the host-guest situation,
the California Supreme Court abolished the long-standing common-
law distinctions of care owed by landowners to business invitees,
licensees-guests and trespassers, and imposed a duty on landowners
of ordinary care for the protection of all persons whose presence on
the land might reasonably be anticipated.
12. See note 2 supra.
13. 8 Cal. 3d at 865-66, 506 P.2d at 219-20, 106 CaL Rptr. at 395-96.
14. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). Indeed,
this principle was employed by the Court to uphold a Connecticut
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the legislature may have concluded that it is the auto class, in
particular, in which the evil of "chilling," ungrateful lawsuits is felt
most sharply.
Moreover, in finding that the guest statute created a disparity
in protection between social guests on one's land and guests in
one's automobile, the court employed some rather self-serving
reasoning. When the legislature enacted the guest statute, the
social guest on one's land was receiving a similar, less-than-ordi-
nary standard of care from his host. It was only after the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court subsequently changed its common-law host-
guest rule in the property situation that inequality arose between
these two types of guests.15 Thus, it can be argued that the court
and not the guest statute created the current unequal treatment
afforded these two types of guests.
B. Auto Passengers vs. Auto Guests
The court next concluded that the disparity of care afforded
the auto guest, as opposed to the paying auto passenger, lacked
any rational justification. 6 This conclusion was predicated on
three points.
First, the court held the guest statute is premised, in part, on
the theory that "you get what you pay for." Since the guest, un-
like the passenger, does not pay the driver anything for the ride,
he has no right to expect ordinary care. The court concluded
that such a principle is unconstitutionally irrational because no
principle in the legal system dictates that one must pay a fee be-
fore he can demand protection from negligent injury. To bolster
this contention, the court pointed to the liability that currently
arises in what it termed "concrete analogous situations." For ex-
ample, the court cited the fact that a driver owes a duty of ordi-
nary care to a pedestrian, yet the pedestrian has not paid the
driver at all. In this analysis, however, the court failed to recog-
nize that the lesser standard of care given a non-paying auto guest
under the guest statute is premised largely upon the fact that in
return for this lesser protection, the auto guest is receiving a
benefit in the form of a free ride. The pedestrian, on the other
hand, is receiving no such benefit from the driver. His relation-
ship with the driver therefore does not constitute an "analogous sit-
uation."
guest statute against an equal protection attack in Silver v. Silver,
280 U.S. 117 (1929).
15. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
16. 8 CaL 3d at 866, 506 P.2d at 220, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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Second, the court found that the passenger-guest distinction is
predicated upon the notion that a guest's suit against his generous
host constitutes the epitome of "ingratitude," because the host-
driver must personally pay for the costs of the injury incurred by
the free-loading guest. Hence, this ingratitude ought to be con-
demned and eliminated by denying the guest a cause of action
for mere negligence. However, while a guest's lawsuit and judg-
ment against his host-driver's pocketbook may have once engen-
dered ingratitude, the Brown court found that this is not the case
today due to the wide presence of automobile liability insurance.
Put simply, it is the host's insurer that feels the financial sting of the
judgment and not the host himself. Consequently, the court rea-
soned that the lesser degree of care afforded the guest no longer
bears any rational relation to this statutory purpose of the pro-
tection of hospitality and the elimination of ingratitude.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court failed to consider that,
in many cases, the personal injury judgment will exceed the
driver's insurance limits. This excess judgment is due primarily
to today's large personal injury judgments and the fact that mini-
mum statutory insurance amounts are typically quite low.1 7
There is a definite possibility for "ingratitude" in the excess-judg-
ment situation, which the court simply failed to consider in its
analysis of the statute's rationality. Furthermore, the court's conclu-
sion is based on the assumption that ingratitude relates solely to
the financial aspects of the lawsuit; that is, the issue of who must
pay for the guest's injuries. No mention is made of the possible
ingratitude which may flow from a host having to tolerate the dis-
comfort and inconvenience of a lawsuit against him. In short, the
legislature may well have found that the "ingratitude" element
goes far beyond the mere financial aspect of the suit. The legis-
lature's determination in this area should have been given defer-
ence by the court. It is the legislature and not the court which
is best equipped to evaluate how automobile drivers behave in re-
sponse to a lawsuit against them by their auto guest.'8
Third, the court concluded that prior decisions in California tort
law readily establish the principle that, however important or
17. For example California has minimum statutory requirements of only$15,000/$20,000/$5,000. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 16451 (West 1968). Ne-
braska statutory requirements are even lower at $10,000/$20,000/
$5,000. NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-509 (Reissue 1968).
18. It is important to note that research fails to discover any empirical
data available to determine whether a guest's lawsuit against his host
does in fact create the feeling of "ingratitude" in the first place, and
whether that feeling (if created) has been totally erased by the host's
liability insurance protection.
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laudable the existence of generosity may be in society, it is simply
"irrational" to protect and encourage that generosity by allowing
the donor to afford the recipient of his generosity a lower stand-
ard of care than that owed to all other persons.19 Following this
principle, the guest-passenger classification was deemed clearly
unreasonable and violative of the equal protection guarantee.20
In its eagerness to topple the guest statute, the Brown court's
rationale must be labelled for what it is, namely, a judicial at-
tempt to abrogate a much disliked legislative act. It is apparent
that there are two competing social considerations in this area,
the encouragement of generosity in society and the interest in
compensating injured persons. The legislature has given a pref-
erence for the former consideration at the expense of the latter.
Certainly this preference may be deemed unwise, but it is defini-
nitely not "irrational" in any equal protection sense, even under
the demanding rationality standard being applied by the Califor-
nia court. It is well established that unwise laws may nonethe-
less pass constitutional muster under the equal protection guar-
antees.21
C. Sub-Classes Of Auto Guests
The court also found that the guest statute expressly, and as
applied in actual cases, creates different sub-classifications among
auto guests. Specifically, the statutory language stipulates that
those auto guests injured "during the ride" cannot recover. Yet,
in actual cases, recovery has been allowed to an auto guest who
19. 8 Cal. 3d at 870-71, 506 P.2d at 223, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 399. The spe-
cific tort cases relied upon by the court were (1) Rowland v. Chris-
tian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 CaL Rptr. 97 (1968), which elim-
inated the common-law degrees of care which a landowner owes per-
sons upon his land, and (2) Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d
241 (1951) and Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d
798 (1939), which abolished the common-law charitable immunity
rule.
If this principle is "irrational," one can question the fate of the
typical "good samaritan" statute which generally provides that any
medically licensed person who gratuitously volunteers aid to an in-jured party is held only to the standard of good faith in the appli-
cation of that aid. (The Nebraska statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1152
(Supp. 1972), goes even further in apparently supplying any gratui-
tous volunteer with an absolute blanket of immunity against civil
liability.) The guest statute and the good samaritan statute are sim-
ilar in that both were enacted to encourage certain gratuitous acts
which society deems important, even at the expense of lowering the
standard of care which that donee receives from his donor.
20. 8 Cal. 3d at 870-71, 506 P.2d at 223, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
21. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
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sustained injuries as a result of the driver's negligence while the
ride was momentarily stopped by the necessity to check the car's
tires.22 The statute also stipulates that an auto guest injured "in
any vehicle" cannot recover. Yet, an auto guest who was injured
while having one foot on the ground and the other on the running
board of a lurching car was allowed recovery.23 Lastly, the stat-
ute specifies that an auto guest injured while the car is travelling
"upon a highway" cannot recover for ordinary negligence; but if
the injury occurs while the car is travelling upon a private road
or private property, recovery is allowed.24
In viewing these statutory exceptions and the sub-classifica-
tions of auto guests which they create in actual cases, the court
concluded that the disparity in treatment bore absolutely no
relation to the purpose of protecting the host's hospitality. The
court reasoned that since the hospitality of a host does not vary
in these different situations so as to support this disparity in care,
the scheme failed to meet minimum equal protection require-
ments.
25
The court's analysis of this particular sub-scheme has merit in
that the basic equal protection guarantee requires that similarly
situated persons in respect to the purpose of a law be treated
equally.26 With respect to the protection of a host's hospitality,
there does not appear to be any discernible difference between the
situation where the auto guest is injured on the public highway,
and where an injury is received while on a privately owned road.
As a result, any disparity in treatment afforded these guests does
lack a rational foundation.
III. PREVENTION OF COLLUSION PURPOSE
A. Auto Passengers vs. Auto Guests
The second proffered purpose behind denying a guest a cause
of action in negligence against his driver is that of preventing col-
lusive lawsuits between an insured driver and his guest rider. In
denying a cause of action in negligence to all auto guests, the court
determined that the statute was invidiously over-inclusive and
thus violative of the equal protection guarantee. 27
22. Boyd v. Cress, 46 Cal. 2d 164, 293 P.2d 37 (1956).
23. Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940).
24. O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 429 P.2d 160, 59 Cal. Rptr.
840 (1967).
25. 8 Cal. 3d at 878, 506 P.2d at 228-29, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
26. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
27. 8 CaL 3d at 876, 506 P.2d at 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
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The gist of the court's reasoning was that the primary equal
protection guarantee requires that similarly situated persons re-
ceive equal treatment. As a result, a regulatory statute which
is grossly over-incluisive in its classification scheme violates this
fundamental guarantee. The court concluded that this basic equal
protection guarantee was being violated because the majority of
auto guests are honest and are not acting in collusion, while only
a "small segment" of those auto guests are dishonest and would
act collusively. Hence, in treating all of these auto guests alike
by denying all guests a cause of action in negligence, the statute
violated the constitutional prohibition of overly-inclusive statu-
tory schemes.
The court further held the statute irrational because it created
a wholesale elimination of causes of action for auto guests when
such a wholesale elimination was not needed. The court reasoned
that the trier of fact is quite able to detect any collusion of
fraud by a guest in the ordinary situation.28
The court's analysis can be criticized for two reasons. First,
the court assumed that most auto guests are, in fact, not willing
to act in collusion when placed in this situation. However, the
court cites no authority for this basic premise, other than judicial
surmise. Granted, there are some members of the autQ guest class
who are honest in this situation. The question is whether this
group of honest members constitutes the majority of all auto
guests, as the Brown court would believe, or whether it consti-
tutes merely a small portion of all auto guests. This is a determi-
nation for which there is no empirical data. Obviously, this is
the sort of determination which a court should defer to the ex-
perience and estimative judgment of the legislature. It is appar-
ent that legislators believe the temptation or actual incidence of
collusion and fraud by auto guests is extremely high and merits
this wholsesale treatment, harsh as it may appear. Second, the legis-
ture may also have, determined that in automobile cases, the ele-
ment of collusion is especially difficult to detect and, therefore,
justifies a wholesale elimination of a negligence cause of action.29
The.court may feel that it is capable of detecting any collusion in
28. Id. at 877 n.18, 506 P.2d at 228, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
29. In Tisko v. Harrison, 500 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), a lower
Texas court refused to be p6rsuaded by the Brown rationale proffered
by the plaintiff and held the Texas guest statute to be non-violative
of equal protection guarantees. The Tisko decision is based, in part,
on the court's recognition that the collusion element is quite difficult
or impossible to detect in the specific case and thus justifies a whole-
sale elimination of all causes of action in ordinary negligence for
guests. -
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the specific case; indeed, it may be unwise for a legislature not to
place this trust and responsibility in its judicial system. But such a
decision is not irrational in any equal protection sense, and the
court should respect the judgment of the legislative body in
such a matter.
B. Sub-Classes Of Auto Guests
As in its "protection of hospitality" analysis, the court held
the sub-classifications expressly created by the statute and as ap-
plied in actual cases bore no rational relation to the statute's pur-
pose of preventing collusive lawsuits.30 The court reasoned that
the risk of fraud and collusion is not any greater where, for
example, the guest's injury occurs on a highway than where it
occurs on a private road. Likewise, the risk is no greater where
the guest is injured while actually in the car than where the in-jury occurs while the guest is getting into the car or standing
on the running board of the car.
The court's conclusion about the "in the car" distinction is
sound, for the risk of collusion is no greater where the guest is
injured after he is within the car than where the injury occurs
while he is in the process of getting into that car. It is also diffi-
cult to distinguish the situation where the injury occurs "on a
highway" from where the injury occurs on a private road. Com-
mon sense suggests that collusion could even occur more readily
on a private road, where there are typically no other witnesses
around to substantiate the guest's story.
IV. IMPLICATIONS IN NEBRASKA
There are no reported Nebraska decisions in which the Ne-
braska guest statute31 has been attacked as violating the equal pro-
tection guarantee of either the Nebraska or the United States
30. 8 Cal. 3d at 878, 506 P.2d at 228-29, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-740 (Reissue 1968) sets forth the Nebraska guest
statute:
The owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable
for any damages to any passenger or person riding in such
motor vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not for hire,
unless such damage is caused by the driver of such motor
vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
because of the gross negligence of the owner or operator in
the operation of such motor vehicle. For the purpose of this
section, the term guest is hereby defined as being a person
who accepts a ride in any motor vehicle without giving com-
pensation therefor, but shall not be construed to apply to or
include any such passenger in a motor vehicle being demon-
strated to such passenger as a prospective purchaser.
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Constitutions. Moreover, only one decision can be found in which
its constitutionality has been challenged. That unsuccessful attack
was based on the contention that the statute violated Article I,
Section 13 of the Nebraska Constitution, which guarantees every
person a remedy at law for all injuries done to him or her by
another. 32
The implications of Brown as to the constitutionality of the Ne-
braska guest statute appear quite minimal. First, and most im-
portantly, it is quite apparent that the California court employed
a very demanding traditional "rationality" standard of review
under the equal protection clauses. The Nebraska court, on the
other hand, has not imposed such a demanding rationality standard-
ard upon the legislature.33 Moreover, two of the classification
schemes created by the California guest statute are essentially
non-existent in Nebraska law. First, there is no disparity in treat-
ment afforded the social guest on one's land, as opposed to the
social guest in one's automobile. Both are denied a duty of ordi-
nary care.34 Second, unlike its California counterpart, the Ne-
braska guest statute does not create any sub-classes of auto guests.
The statute does contain the "in such motor vehicle" language; but
unlike the California situation, there has yet been no case in
which this statutory language has been judicially construed to cre-
ate a "sub-classification" in fact.3 5
32. In Rogers v. Brown, 129 Neb. 9, 260 N.W. 794 (1935), the plaintiff
claimed, inter alia, that the guest statute, by its higher requirement
of gross negligence, effectively took away any remedy which an in-jured guest had received at the hands of his host. The court held
the guest act did not take away a guest's remedy, but 'merely
changed the degree of proof essential to a recovery for damages."
129 Neb. at 12, 260 N.W. at 796.
33. Especially in the area of economics and social welfare, which are the
two areas that essentially underlie the guest statute, the Nebraska
court has shown great deference toward legislative classifications and
policy determinations in the area of equal protection. Thompson v.
Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
34. Under the Nebraska guest statute, a host-driver owes his guest pas-
senger only the duty of not being grossly negligent. Similarly, the
landowner host only owes a guest on his land the duty of not acting
with wilful misconduct. Casey v. Addison, 190 Neb. 634, 211 N.W.2d
410 (1973). Hence, in both situations, the guest is afforded less than
ordinary care.
35. It could be argued that applying the "general definitions" for the
rules of the road set forth in NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-741 (Supp. 1972),
the Nebraska guest statute does create the public property-private
property classification. The rationale would be: The guest statute
only applies to auto guests who are injured while riding in a "motor
vehicle." Section 39-741 defines a motor vehicle as any self-propelled
"vehicle." A "vehicle" is defined as every device, in, upon or by
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The only classification which the Nebraska statute does cre-
ate is that between automobile guests and automobile passengers.
In analyzing this guest-passenger classification in light of the
protection of hospitality purpose, it would seem that the insurance
argument proffered in Brown is just as applicable in the Nebraska
context. Hence, it is arguable that because of compulsory auto-
mobile insurance, there is no longer any notion of "ingratitude" in
a guest's lawsuit against the host-driver's insurer. Similarly, con-
cerning the prevention of collusion purpose, the overly-inclusive
classification argument would be just as relevant as it was in
Brown.
V. CONCLUSION
The result reached in Brown is commendable, because the
guest statute should be repealed. The statute frustrates the grow-
ing trend in modem tort law to eliminate degrees of care and to
provide compensation for accident victims. However, in its ea-
gerness to see this result accomplished, the Brown court has se-
verely stretched the "ratonality" standard of review under the
equal protection guarantee in its analysis. As a result, the court
has not only opened itself to fairly-levelled charges of judicial
intervention in the legislative arena but has also imposed a de-
manding burden of rationality on the shoulders of the legislative
body.
Timothy J. McDermott '75
which any person or property may be transported upon a "highway,"
and a "highway" is defined as the width between the boundary lim-
its of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open
to the public for purposes of vehicular travel.
